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From Social to National Issue:
Abortion Debates in Serbia in the 1990s
During the socialist era in eastern Europe, abortion had been a medical or social issue, not a
politicized women’s issue.1 This has changed in post-socialism after initiatives to criminalize
or restrict availability of abortion were put forward in newly elected multi-party parliaments.
Abortion debates inside and outside the parliaments became a forum of political competition
in which much broader issues were at stake, like anti-communist morality, nationhood, and
demographic trends. Being associated with socialism and its project of women’s emancipa-
tion, abortion became a symbol of socialist gender relations. These relations were perceived
as ›unnatural‹ and detrimental for the national well being and its survival. Thus the female
(non)reproductive body also came to symbolize ›unnatural‹ gender relations which threaten
the very survival of the nation. Since high abortion rates in eastern Europe are commonly per-
ceived as a direct cause of low birth rates and vice versa, abortion debates were tied with the
population discourses related to the differential birth rates of ethnic/national groups, pur-
porting that the abortion debate focused on demography and population politics.
In this article I analyse abortion debates in Serbia in the early 1990s. I identify three dis-
cursive events that triggered and intensified the debate: the first was the bill to ban abortion
submitted to the Parliament of the Republika Srpska by an Orthodox Bishop, who was also a
member of the parliament; second, the parliamentary debate of the new law in Serbia and the
subsequent veto by then-President Milošević of the version passed in the Parliament; and third,
the 1994 Christmas message of the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church. I focus here
on the second event.
Several years passed between the first multi-party elections in Serbia and the beginning of
the discussion of a new abortion law in the Parliament. The first elections took place in late 1990,
but the bill was introduced in 1994. In the 1990 elections, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) won
a massive parliamentary majority and Slobodan Milošević was elected the President. Serbia had
another parliamentary and presidential election in 1991 when Slobodan Milošević was re-elect-
ed as the President, and the Serbian Radical Party (occupying the far right, nationalist end on
the political spectrum)2 made substantial parliamentary gains. In late 1993 Milošević dissolved
the Serbian parliament and called new elections which took place in December. In the elections
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both the Serbian Radical Party and Milošević’s SPS suffered losses.After a round of unsuccessful
negotiations with several bigger opposition parties, the Socialist party made a coalition gov-
ernment with the small New Democracy Party3 in February of 1994.4
This constituted the immediate political context within which the abortion debate was
opened in parliament.As long as Milošević’s SPS had an unchallenged majority in parliament,
the old ›socialist‹ abortion law remained unchallenged as well. As heirs of the Communist
Party, the Socialists adhered to the pro-choice ideology. The issue of abortion was brought to
the fore by new players on the Serbian political landscape, religious leaders being the primary
example. The attempt of the Orthodox Church to regain influence in the public and private
spaces in post-socialist Serbia has been similar to that of the Catholic Church elsewhere. The
parliamentary debate started in early 1994, and the first version was passed in May 1994, but
was vetoed by Milošević in June. He explained that the version of the law as adopted ran against
the basic human right to decide freely about offspring.
After Milošević’s veto, the new abortion law was back in the hands of the government,
which started working on a new version rather than changing individual acts. It took six
months for the government to come before parliament with another version of the abortion
law. This version of the law is more restrictive than the old socialist law and than the first ver-
sion that was vetoed by Milošević. First, it does not include any social reasons for obtaining
abortion after the 10th week of gestation. Second, the law requires minors between the ages 16-
18 to obtain parental consent for having an abortion. Finally, the law does not specify proce-
dures for obtaining late gestation abortions and does not require explanation of the decision.
Moreover, the decisions are final and cannot be appealed.5
The limitations introduced in the abortion law potentially affect mostly those age cohorts
that do not contribute significantly to the overall birth rates. It is thus difficult to see a popu-
lation policy motive behind them. Rather than being informed by a coherent social policy, the
new abortion legislation was shaped through a political struggle for a hegemonic status of spe-
cific ideas about individual and society, gender and nation.
The Nation’s Rights versus Women’s Rights
The character of the abortion debate in Serbia is best illustrated through the argument that un-
folded on the pages of NIN magazine between December of 1994 and March of 1995. It start-
ed after NIN published an article by Zorica Mršević, one of the leading feminists in Serbia, en-
titled »Who is going to feed us, who is going to defend us?« (»Ko će da nas hrani, ko će da nas
brani?«), which critiqued the new abortion law under discussion in the Serbian Parliament.
A critical response to her article was signed by Slobodan Grković, president of the Chris-
tian-ecological movement and appeared in the same magazine under the title »Don’t bear
children« (»Ne radjajte decu«).6 Apparently for strategic reasons, a comment to this article
came from another prominent feminist, Nadežda Ćetković, under the title »Bear only wanted
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children« (»Radjate samo željenu decu«).7 The polemic ended with a letter to the editor, titled
»Biological war and self-defence« (»Biološki rat i samo-odbrana«).8
The initial article had the headline »Abortion to be banned«, which was an exaggeration.
Mršević never specifies that her criticism refers to restrictions proposed for late abortions. The
proposed law restricted access to abortion after ten weeks to medical reasons, unlike the old
socialist one which allowed termination of later pregnancies for socio-economic reasons.
While her criticism is well placed, particularly given that the majority of requests for late abor-
tions were based on socio-economic reasons, the article should have been more specific if the
author wanted to represent the proposed law accurately. But accuracy, apparently, was not the
primary goal of the article. The criticism of the new abortion law here had a broader agenda.
It served as a critique of the existing social and political order and to offer guidelines for bet-
ter ones.
The author argued that the proposed law was motivated by »mercantile population theo-
ry which was born towards the end of the middle ages«.9 This type of pronatalism, argues
Mršević, has characterized every totalitarian regime, and she mentioned Hitler, Mussolini,
Stalin, Pinochet and Ceausescu as examples. Moreover, she argues that legal abortion has been
a long-standing women’s right, which was another exaggeration.10 Finally the author claims
that the current treatment of the abortion law in eastern Europe stands as »indisputable proof
for how far away from democracy these societies still are«.11 Applying this standard, most of
the West European countries would not have passed the democracy test before the 1970s, and
a few would not pass it today, e.g. Ireland, Malta and Monaco, where abortion is still illegal,
and Portugal, Spain and Germany, where abortion is allowed under specific, narrowly defined
conditions.12
Mršević is more accurate in discussing some possible social consequences of the proposed
abortion law. For example, she predicts an increase in health and life threatening illegal abor-
tions because »women always have their own ways and methods«.13 Her prediction of an in-
crease in the number of unwanted and abandoned children as the consequence of the new
abortion law, however, is unfounded.
Had abortion been banned and criminalized, Mršević would have had ample historical
evidence in support of her argument, but that simply was not the case. There is little doubt that
Milošević’s regime was in many ways detrimental for Serbian society, leading it to an unfore-
seeably austere future. The new abortion law, however, passed in the parliament controlled by
his Socialist party, was hardly a part of that picture and was certainly not going to produce an
army of unwanted and abandoned children.
The new abortion law was restrictive as compared to the old socialist law, but all restric-
tions applied to late abortions.14 Considering that over 95 percent of all abortions in Serbia are
done before the tenth week of pregnancy,15 it was going to affect a very small percentage of
women and mostly those age groups that have low reproductive rates (teenagers and women
over 45).While the possible consequences of the new abortion law were not insignificant, they
were not as dramatic as Mršević’s article depicts them.
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The text in a separate box which accompanied the article informed on precisely what kind
of changes the new law introduced and at which point during the pregnancy; Mršević’s text,
read by itself, suggests more drastic changes. This made her article an easy target for criticism
from those who wanted to see a more restrictive abortion law or argued for banning it. Grković,
the president of the Christian-ecological movement, begins his response to Mršević by blam-
ing her for deliberate misrepresentations of the new law.
Grković accuses Mršević of feigning humanism and for forging the facts, claiming that the
proposed draft law introduced only limited restrictions and that under it, the »genocide of the
Serbian babies will continue«.16 He also points to the fact that 95 percent of abortions were per-
formed within the first ten weeks of pregnancy, which makes the feminist response look blown
out of proportion. Grković believes that the proposed changes in the abortion law came about
in response to population trends. He believes that the regime simply »could not ignore (any
more) the NATAL CATASTROPHE of the Serbian nation and its main reason: infanticide«
(original emphasis).17 He compares abortion with Jasenovac, the concentration camp in which
many Serbs, Roma and Jews were detained and executed during World War II in the Inde-
pendent State of Croatia, suggesting that women who have abortions are murderers. More-
over, he argues, these women are committing genocide on their own nation. Grković recreates
a common perception, according to which abortion is women’s method of contraceptive
choice, and thus he holds them responsible for »mass killings« of the »Serbian babies«.
Both popular and expert discourses in Serbia often present abortion as women’s method
of choice due to its high rates.18 Nationalist oriented discourses additionally argued that women
use abortion and limit the size of the family for selfish reasons with little concern for the in-
terests of the father or society, i.e. the nation. Nothing can be further from the truth. Far from
being the method of choice, abortion has become a rescue method when coitus interruptus,
the method chosen by a majority of couples, fails. This method of pregnancy prevention, while
highly unreliable, results from and reinforces patriarchal gender/sexual relations.19
The control of female procreative sexuality is an integral part of many nationalist projects
and aims to ensure and maintain not only continuity, but also the »purity« of a nation. With-
in the marriage, abortion serves to limit the family size while maintaining »proper« gender
roles, i. e. husband’s domination and the wife’s submission, in the domain of sexual relations.20
From the perspective of nationalist ideologues, however, abortion appears to undermine the
patriarchal order at the broader, societal level, preventing the state control of the citizens’ sex-
uality and reproductive practices.
Restricting access to abortion in the context in which a small family is both social standard
and a necessity, creates a tension between the patriarchal family on the one hand and the pa-
triarchal state on the other. The tension, though, is concealed by the oppositional/contrary
consciousness created during socialism, according to which abortion is primarily associated
with women and moreover with women’s emancipation. The only difference is that in the post-
socialist, nationalist context this equation has received a negative connotation for allegedly de-
stroying the patriarchal order within the family while endangering the nation.
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While Mršević associates free access to abortion with democracy, Grković identifies it with
socialism,totalitarianism and moreover with communist conspiracy against the Serbian nation.
The nationalist discourses reproduced the popular view, created during the socialist era
and supported by the official communist ideology, that feminism simply aims to replace male
domination by female domination. Unlike the old communist ideology, nationalist discourses
did not distinguish between the socialist project of emancipation and western, liberal femi-
nism. Moreover, according to nationalist narrative, socialism itself was a feminist project which
emasculated individual men and the nation.21 Liberal abortion legislation and high abortion
rates were thus perceived as an expression of women’s domination over men and the nation.
Moreover, as Grković suggests, women’s rule is not different from a blind rule of instincts. Thus
it is anti-modern and retrograde, unlike reason-driven male rule.
For Grković, both Milošević and abortion symbolized the dark and destructive communist
past. Mršević, on the other hand, takes up both Milošević and restrictive abortion laws in order
to project a future even darker than the present. While Grković sees in Milošević a communist
and hence anti-nationalist, Mršević uses the new abortion law to portray him as a nationalist.
A response to Grković’s article came from another prominent feminist and the mother of
three, Nadežda Ćetković’s. She accused the author of misogyny and the text itself as an inco-
herent jumble that should not have been published, because the statements it contains are stu-
pid and dangerous. She stated that »abortion is neither genocide nor infanticide (…) but a
legitimate method of birth control«.22 Challenging this right undermines »women’s human
rights and goes against existing laws in FR Yugoslavia. These rights and laws are protected by
the United Nation’s Convention and by the Constitution of this country«.23 – In response to
Grković’s indirect defence of the rights of the foetus, Ćetković, together with other feminists,
puts forward an old liberal feminist argument: »It is ridiculous to treat the foetus’ and woman’s
rights equally – it turns woman into an incubator«.24
This approach, however, makes the feminist position vulnerable to criticism because »(t)he
individual-right-to-choose argument unwittingly reinforces the powerful rhetoric of anti-
feminism (…) By definition, rights pertain to every individual. The foetus as a person or a po-
tential human has a right to life, to be protected by the government. This sets up a conflict of
competing rights (…) and the debate is framed as a clash of absolutes«.25 For that reason some
feminists in the west moved »from the idea of rights to the idea of reproductive freedom«.26
It is argued that the concept of reproductive freedom has the advantage of being applicable
to individual women, as well as to women as a group. In addition, freedom entails the con-
cern for a set of women’s needs including those related to social relations of reproduction with
access to abortion being one of them.27
Indeed it is not difficult to argue that safe, legal, medical abortion is even more than a need
for women in Serbia. It is a necessity which comes about as a result of unequal gender power
relations in general and unequal social relationships of sexuality and reproduction in par-
ticular. Ćetković, however, like the other Serbian feminists based her pro-choice arguments on
the liberal ideology of women’s rights. Her final blow to her Christian opponent, however, came
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in the form of a reminder that the ideas he professed had originated in the Catholic Church
and the USA, both viewed as agents of anti-Serbian conspiracy by the nationalists.
For all the participants in the abortion debate it served as a forum for contesting the exist-
ing and projecting a more desirable social and political order. For feminists and their Christian
opponents alike, the proposed abortion law was a metaphor of Milošević’s rule. For feminists it
symbolized an undemocratic, totalitarian regime. For Grković it symbolized a continuation of
not only socialism, but also of communist and fascist conspiracy against the Serbian nation
which, according to him, had resulted in its biological, moral and spiritual degradation.
While for Grković the liberal abortion law stood for a retrograde society and degraded na-
tion, for feminists the proposed restrictions symbolized the future that was to come as a result
of the regime’s politics. At a broader level the polemic was yet another expression of irrecon-
cilable differences among various actors on the political scene in Serbia. While most of them
were critical of the regime, their criticisms were based on opposing ideologies and projections
of society. Like in unified Germany, the abortion discourses in Serbia in the 1990s were »(a)
key conceptual element in both forms of post-socialist discourse (…) the definition of demo-
cracy and its relation to reproductive politics«.28
Abortion legislation, in a way, illustrates how citizens of eastern European counties have
experienced new democracies, politically. In Poland, Hungary and Serbia,29 public opinion was
predominantly against banning or restricting the existing laws. Still all three parliaments
passed laws which went counter to the popular view. The same paradox between the ideology
of democracy as the rule of the majority and the reality of party-dominated political life ex-
ists in most western democracies. Unlike the western societies, the eastern European ones have
not had enough time to create myths, which would help reconcile the paradox, to paraphrase
Henry Levi-Strauss. That is why reformed communist parties won the second parliamentary
elections in many eastern European countries. By giving their votes to the former communists,
the citizens of these countries expressed, among other things, their disappointment with re-
presentational democracy. »The G.D.R. citizens imagined democracy as something other than
a clash of parties and party interests. The abortion decision30 thus became emblematic of the
›democracy deficit‹«31 and this »deficit« was felt in almost all other areas of political and social
life, throughout post-socialist eastern Europe.
Men’s Rights and the Nation’s Rights
Some legal commentators in Serbia, however, focused on different aspects of the new abortion
law and joined the religious leaders in addressing the issue of not only the right to life, but also
the rights of men and national collectivity, opposing these rights to women’s rights.
Personal autonomy is not an absolute right and it can be exercised only as long as it
does not interfere with the rights of others. And others (in this case) are the commu-
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nity, the men (and) the unborn child. We cannot discuss the population replacement
as an issue related only to (individual) human rights and freedoms.32
The order of priorities here is not incidental.Abortion threatens first, the survival of the com-
munity i.e. the nation, second, men’s rights to offspring, and only thirdly, the right to life of the
unborn. All three, however, have been overpowered by women.
Discussing the question of when life begins, which in many legal systems serves to deter-
mine the gestation period during which abortion is available on request, Ponjavić takes the
position that life begins at conception and that the foetus’ rights should also be protected.
While elaborating his position, the author not only defines »biology as women’s destiny« but
also argues that this »destiny« should be reinforced by (human) laws.
The mother offers a sanctuary, warmth and food to this (new) life, because such are the
laws of nature.Why then, (should) we hesitate to impose on a woman (the mother) the
respect for life of the conceived child (which would be) an expression of a general duty
of all to protect life of others.33
Taking up the legal status of the father Ponjavić claims that »the rights of men are completely
neglected«,34 and while defending the interests of the community, he argues that »in these times
of transition we have to search for a new balance between the respect for human rights and
freedoms, on one hand, and for a social project aimed at increasing the number of births, i.e.
at decreasing the number of terminated pregnancies, on the other«.35
While the pro-life discourses in the west are embedded in the rhetoric of universal, indi-
vidual, human rights (including that of a foetus), the anti-abortion discourses in Serbia were
primarily concerned with the collective rights, or the survival of the nation. As the analysis
above shows, even religious leaders in Serbia were superimposing the national survival to the
right to life in their arguments against abortion. For that reason, I distinguish between the pro-
life and anti-abortion discourses. Save for Bishop Vasilije, the creator of the bill for banning
abortion in Republika Srpska, almost no one else really argued that abortion should be
banned. More than a few, however, did call for sharp restrictions in the existing law, primari-
ly in order to prevent the alleged dying out of the nation.
The pro-choice feminist discourses, on the other hand, framed by the rhetoric of women’s
rights, freedom and autonomy,were embedded in the liberal political ideology and strongly anti-
nationalist. The expert’s pro-choice arguments focused on the issues of women’s and public
health, and espoused a broad spectrum of political ideas from very conservative, nationalist, to
ultra liberal.Only a few experts,however,regardless of their political inclinations, failed »to claim
(that they) ›know better‹«36 about abortion and its risks not only for the health of individual
women, but also for the well being of the overall society as well. The abortion debate suggests
that ideas of social engineering focused on female bodies and wrapped up in many different poli-
tical colours were firmly embedded in the ideological fabric of Serbian society in the 1990s.
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Conclusion
The abortion debate in Serbia began and unfolded as an argument between the Orthodox
clergy and feminists, while both were (re)appropriating space on the political and social scene.
Unlike in Hungary, where feminists had a marginal role in the abortion debate, or Germany
and Poland, where it created divisions in the feminist movement, in Serbia, feminists had a
prominent role in the debate. Moreover, the abortion issue served as a centrifugal force for the
feminist movement rather than a point of division. As in other post-socialist countries, how-
ever, the debate did not mobilize larger numbers of women.
Other participants in the debate in Serbia were experts from various fields (cf. demogra-
phy, medicine and law) and members of newly formed, small and often obscure political and
religious organizations (for example the Christian-ecological movement).
Like in other places (cf. Hungary, Poland) all the participants in the abortion debate in Ser-
bia used it as a forum for addressing broader social/political issues. Approached from this
angle, discourses on abortion appear to be a commentary on society and the state, their past,
current and future relationships, and about the nation. In as much as the debate was about
abortion, it was about demography and public health, about women and gender, with men be-
ing conspicuously absent.
Men were only rarely mentioned in relation to abortion, and even then they would be as-
signed a passive role or that of a victim of women’s power ›to decide on their own‹. Women
having abortions were presented either as selfish egoists; as victims of their own ignorance
while holding on to traditional values and behaviour; or as victims within the hierarchically
organized gender relations of power.
There were few common denominators of the abortion debate in Serbia. First, abortion
was perceived as a measure of women’s autonomy and as a symbol of their emancipation;
second, high abortion rates were linked directly to the low birth rates; finally abortion was
represented as women’s method of choice. These denominators had different meanings for
various participants in the debate, but they were not disputed as such. All of them, however,
are a legacy of the socialist abortion politics.
Throughout the 20th century, abortion had been simultaneously liberalized and prosecuted
by most totalitarian regimes and criminalized by some of the longest standing democracies in
Europe. For that reason it could be treated as a prerequisite and as a symbol of democracy by
feminists, and as a symbol of totalitarian regimes in the anti-abortion campaign of the 1990s
in Serbia.
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